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Cryptography can be classified as secret-key and public-key cryptography. Both have dis-
tinct features and differs in performance, complexity, flexibility and security. Secret-key
cryptography, considering its simplicity and performance, is commonly used for securing
communications. The invention of public-key cryptography made it possible to develop
more flexible cryptographic schemes and algorithms, such as key exchanges and digital
signatures, hence extending the possibilities and the field of cryptography. Cryptographic
implementations are primordial for securing the Internet, and as a consequence, correct-
ness, security and efficiency are more emphasized. In this sense, this work addresses the
evaluation and the implementation of Ed25519, an instance of the Edwards-curve Digi-
tal Signature Algorithm for digital messages authentication. The implementation lies on
Rust: a safe, modern, high-level and strongly-typed programming language. This work
has two contributions: (i) an Ed25519 implementation in Rust that considers readability,
modularity and ease of use, and (ii) an evaluation of the Ed25519 implementation from a
security/performance perspective. The implementation was comprised by three modules:
field arithmetic, curve arithmetic and the interface. The security perspective presented
essential qualities of cryptographic implementations, such as functional correctness, mem-
ory safety, constant-time operations and usability. The performance evaluation showed
low execution times and proved to be as fast as implementations written in C; Rust’s
RAM consumption showed similar results in comparison to implementations written in
C.
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A criptografia pode ser classificada em simétrica e assimétrica. Ambos diferem-se com
relação ao desempenho, complexidade, flexibilidade e segurança. A criptografia simétrica
é comumente utilizada para estabelecer comunicações secretas. A criptografia assimétrica
foi capaz de ampliar as primitivas criptográficas ao possibilitar primitivas para assinaturas
digitais e acordo de chaves. Implementações criptográficas são primordiais na proteção
de comunicações e informações. Nesse sentido, a segurança, corretude e eficiência são pri-
orizadas. Este trabalho aborda a avaliação e implementação do algoritmo de assinaturas
digitais Ed25519, uma instância do Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm. Este
trabalho tem como objetivo realizar a implementação do algoritmo Ed25519 em Rust,
uma linguagem de programação de alto nível, moderna e fortemente tipada, com foco em
memory safety. Dessa forma, as contribuições são: (i) uma implementação do Ed25519
em Rust que suporta legibilidade, modularidade e facilidade de uso e (ii) a avaliação da
implementação em termos de desempenho e segurança. O desenvolvimento envolveu a im-
plementação de três módulos: aritmética de corpos, aritmética de curvas e interface. Na
perspectiva da segurança, foi possível apresentar atributos essenciais às implementações
criptográficas, tais como correctness, memory safety, usabilidade e operações em tempo
constante. A implementação apresentou tempos de execução aceitáveis e próximos das
implementações em C; além disso, Rust apresentou consumo de memória RAM similar às
implementações em C.
Keywords: Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm; Criptografia de Curva Elíptica;
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The topic of this dissertation is the implementation of a cryptographic library. More
specifically the implementation of the Ed25519 digital signature algorithm (introduced
by Bernstein et al. [1]). We named our implementation ed25519-fun.
In this context, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is a public-key cryptosystem pro-
posed independently by Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller in 1985. The underlying mathe-
matics revolves around elliptic curves and its intractability is based on the Elliptic Curve
Discrete Logarithm Problem [2]. The Ed25519 system is classified as ECC and is based
on the Curve25519 as twisted Edwards curve, providing fast operations and side-channel
resilience [1].
Taking a step back, cryptography can be understood as the study of mathematical
techniques to secure communications [3]. This is primarily accomplished by creating
libraries that implements cryptographic primitives. These libraries lie at the core of the
Internet, and consequently, as well as ensuring their correctness and safety [4], the quality
of the implementation is also tied with efficiency [5].
Brumley et al. [5] illustrated the difficulty of implementing cryptographic primitives.
In parallel, the authors showed how an arithmetic bug could be exploited to mount a full
key recovery attack on the Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman protocol. Lazar et al. [6] ana-
lyzed 269 CVEs (from January 2011 to May 2014) tagged as “Cryptographic Issues” and
classified them as plaintext disclosure, man-in-the-middle attacks, brute-force attacks and
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side-channel attacks, 83% of which were related to the misuse of cryptographic libraries
and 17% were tied to implementation bugs. Since 2018, OpenSSL issued 22 CVEs1, which
enabled attacks classified as side-channel attacks, denial of service attacks, padding oracle
attacks.
Hence, this work dives into the properties and conditions that cryptographic libraries
rely on. We chose to implement the Ed25519 algorithm in Rust - a modern programming
language that aims for safety and performance. As a result, we were able to document
the implementation and explore aspects of performance and security that surrounds the
Ed25519 algorithm and its implementation in Rust.
1.1 Objective
Our objective is the evaluation and implementation of the Ed25519 signature system in
Rust. Therefore, we focus on the security and performance analysis and attempt to justify
the use of Rust for the Ed25519 algorithm implementation. We accomplish this within
three main tasks:
• Implementation of the Ed25519 algorithm in Rust considering good programming
practices.
• Performance evaluation comparing the execution times and memory consumption
of various Ed25519 implementations.
• Evaluation of the Ed25519 algorithm and its implementation in Rust from a security
perspective.
1.2 Focus




• This work is about the comprehension and implementation of the Ed25519 algorithm
in Rust. The implementation is simple and has been influenced by existing Ed25519
implementations, namely the ed25519-donna [7], ed25519-dalek [8] and ed25519-java
[9] implementations.
• This work is about emphasizing the properties of the Ed25519 system. Along with its
properties lies the explanation of the mathematical techniques behind the execution
of the Ed25519 primitives.
• This work is about the analysis of our Ed25519 implementation. This analysis is
twofold. Firstly, an empirical study is performed. Secondly, the relationship between
Rust and secure and fast applications, as well as performance and security details
of the Ed25519 signature system.
• The success of this work is contingent on the success of three factors. The first
factor is the successful execution of the regression tests performed by our Ed25519
implementation in Rust. The second is a comprehensible writing about the core
functions and properties of the implementation and its mathematical techniques.
And lastly, an empirical analysis and the study of Rust features, performance and
security must be presented.
• This work is not about the design of a novel implementation of the Ed25519 algo-
rithm.
Within the analysis of Ed25519‘s performance and security properties and the study of
its mathematical perspective and its development in Rust, this work focuses on delivering
a more comprehensible document that comprises some advanced cryptographic topics.
1.3 Contributions
Our main contributions are defined by:
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• An Ed25519 implementation that prioritizes good programming practices, such as
readability, modularity and ease of use.
• A scientific evaluation of our Ed25519 implementation in Rust, from a perfor-
mance/security perspective.
1.4 Structure
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the theo-
retical background needed for this work. Chapter 3 emphasizes important works related
to the implementation and analysis of the Ed25519 public-key signature system. Chap-
ter 4 presents the methodology used for the Ed25519 implementation and the approach
taken for the description of Ed25519’s properties and its evaluation. Chapter 5 describes
the Ed25519 signature system implementation. Chapter 6 presents the evaluation of the





The purpose of this chapter is to introduce secret-key cryptography and public-key cryp-
tography, and also to explore elliptic curves, specially the twisted edwards curves, and
the Rust programming language.
We begin in Section 2.1 with an introduction to the Rust programming language.
Then, we explain secret-key and public-key cryptography in Section 2.2. The theory for
elliptic curves can be found in Section 2.3. Lastly, Section 2.4 introduces the Ed25519
signature system. Section 2.5 discusses the main ideas presented in this chapter.
2.1 Rust
Rust is a programming language developed at Mozilla Research that offers performance
and safety features. Rust does not depend on a garbage collector, and supports zero-
cost abstractions1, type-safety and memory safety, as well as low-level control [11]. Rust
automatically runs a destructor when a variable goes out of scope [11] and does not use
garbage collection. Instead, ownership tracking allows Rust to know when a resource goes
out of scope, and thus memory leaks are avoided.
During execution, resources are uniquely owned by one alias at a time. C++ enforces
1Rust does not use more CPU, RAM, or code space for tracking type states [10].
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ownership with smart pointers, move semantics and RAII (Resource Acquisition Is Ini-
tialization), however, undefined/unsafe behavior is still possible [11]. Rust’s ownership
discipline, which states that “if ownership of an object (of type T) is shared between
multiple aliases (shared references of type &T), then none of them can be used to directly
mutate it”, prevents use-after-free, data races and iterator validation [11]. Rust’s unique
pointers manages ownership tracking of heap memory, and borrowed references manages
safe aliases [12].
Listings 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 illustrates simple code examples for ownership, borrowing and
lifetimes.
Listing 2.1: Ownership. Source: Rust By Example [13].
// Resources can only have one owner.
// Ownership can be transferred. If that happens, the previous owner
// can no longer be used.
// This function takes ownership of the heap allocated memory
fn destroy_box(c: Box<i32>) {
println!("Destroying a box that contains {}", c);
// `c` is destroyed and the memory freed
}
fn main() {
// _Stack_ allocated integer
let x = 5u32;
// *Copy* `x` into `y` - no resources are moved
let y = x;
// Both values can be independently used
println!("x is {}, and y is {}", x, y);
// `a` is a pointer to a _heap_ allocated integer
let a = Box::new(5i32);
println!("a contains: {}", a);
// *Move* `a` into `b`
let b = a;
// The pointer address of `a` is copied (not the data) into `b`.
// Both are now pointers to the same heap allocated data, but
// `b` now *owns* it.
// !Error! `a` can no longer access the data, because it no longer
// owns the heap memory
//? println!("a contains: {}", a);
// This function takes ownership of the heap allocated memory from `b`
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destroy_box(b);
// Since the heap memory has been freed at this point, this action would
// result in dereferencing freed memory, but it's forbidden by the compiler
// !Error! Same reason as the previous error
//? println!("b contains: {}", b);
}
Listing 2.2: Borrowing. Source: Rust By Example [13].
// Access the data without taking ownership over it.
// This function takes ownership of a box and destroys it
fn eat_box_i32(boxed_i32: Box<i32>) {
println!("Destroying box that contains {}", boxed_i32);
}
// This function borrows an i32
fn borrow_i32(borrowed_i32: &i32) {
println!("This int is: {}", borrowed_i32);
}
fn main() {
// Create a boxed i32, and a stacked i32
let boxed_i32 = Box::new(5_i32);
let stacked_i32 = 6_i32;
// Borrow the contents of the box. Ownership is not taken,
// so the contents can be borrowed again.
borrow_i32(&boxed_i32);
borrow_i32(&stacked_i32);
// `boxed_i32` can now give up ownership to `eat_box` and be destroyed
eat_box_i32(boxed_i32);
}
Listing 2.3: Lifetimes. Source: Rust By Example [13].
// Lifetimes are annotated below with lines denoting the creation
// and destruction of each variable.
// `i` has the longest lifetime because its scope entirely encloses
// both `borrow1` and `borrow2`. The duration of `borrow1` compared
// to `borrow2` is irrelevant since they are disjoint.
fn main() {
let i = 3; // Lifetime for `i` starts.
{
let borrow1 = &i; // `borrow1` lifetime starts.
println!("borrow1: {}", borrow1);
} // `borrow1 ends.
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{
let borrow2 = &i; // `borrow2` lifetime starts.
println!("borrow2: {}", borrow2);
} // `borrow2` ends.
} // Lifetime ends.
2.2 Cryptography
Cryptography is, as defined by Bruce Schneier, “the art and science of keeping messages
secure”. Meanwhile, cryptanalysis focuses on trying to breach the system [14]. Both
complements each other and creates an adversarial way of thinking: there is a defender
and an attacker. When building cryptographic algorithms or cryptographic protocols we
must consider all the possible ways we could break the system [3].
Modern cryptography can be divided into two main categories: secret-key and public-
key cryptography. Prior to the invention of public-key cryptography, communication
channels were secured using secret-key cryptosystems such as the Data Encryption Stan-
dard [3]. They are classified as such for performing encryption and decryption with the
same key. Public-key cryptosystems is an elegant concept invented by Diffie and Hel-
man in 1976 [15]. The understanding that it is possible to form a secure communication
without having to share private information is astounding. Such concept opened a door
that housed a wide variety of possibilities for the expansion of the cryptographic scientific
literature. The RSA and ElGamal systems are instances of public-key cryptosystems.
Contrasting secret-key cryptography, they generate key pairs: a public key and a private
key. They can be used to perform digital signatures, key exchange and encryption.
Figure 2.1 illustrates cryptographic primitives, which are related to aspects of infor-
mation security: confidentiality, data integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. They
can be evaluated in various dimensions: security level, desired functionality and security
property, methods of operation, performance and implementation complexity. Such di-
mensions vary in terms of the security goals of the application, available computational
resources and trade-off between performance and security [14].
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Figure 2.1: Classification of cryptographic primitives. Adapted from: Menezes et al. [3].
Some of the published papers that heavily impacted cryptography were the following:
“La Cryptographie Militaire” [16]. Set of requirements for cypher systems. Kerck-
hoffs states that the attacker knows the details of the encryption and decryption functions.
The security of the communication should depend on the secret key instead of the cryp-
tosystem. This way, cryptographic algorithms (e.g. RSA and AES) can be exhaustively
studied, allowing them to evolve [17].
“Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems” [18]. Theoretical and mathematical
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approach of secrecy systems. Presents the ideas of confusion and diffusion, redundancy,
entropy, and unicity distance [3].
There are several other works worth mentioning, such as: “New Directions in Cryptog-
raphy” [15] (introduction of public key cryptography), “A Method for Obtaining Digital
Signatures and Public Key Cryptosystems” [19] (first public-key cryptosystem, i.e. RSA),
“Secure Communications Over Insecure Channels” [20] (introduction of public key dis-
tribution systems) and many others, which enables a deeper understanding of public key
cryptography.
2.2.1 Symmetric Cryptography
The most common use for secret-key cryptography is establishing secure communication
channels. For each communication channel we need a secret key K, which is shared
between the entities. The keyK is used for performing message encryption and decryption
[21].
Example 2.2.1 describes an example of secret-key cryptography showed in Figure 2.2.
Example 2.2.1. Secret-key Encryption
Figure 2.2: Example of secret-key cryptography.
1 Bob transforms the plaintext P into the ciphertext C with the encryption function
E: C = E(P,K), s.t. P and K are inputs for the encryption function and K is the
secret key.
2 Bob sends C to Alice and the message C becomes public information.
12 CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
3 Alice retrieves the plaintext P from the ciphertext C using the decryption function
D: P = D(C,K), s.t. C and K are inputs for the decryption function and K is the
secret key.
Secret-key systems can be further classified as block ciphers and stream ciphers [22]:
Block cipher. A block cipher operates over iterations of permutations and substitutions.
Essentially, each iteration needs a round function, defined by the state of the message and
a subkey, as well as a key schedule, formed by N subkeys derived from the secret key.
Examples of block ciphers: AES and 3DES.
Stream cipher. Instead of encryption algorithms being applied on blocks of data (block
cipher), a stream cipher is applied on one bit at a time in a data stream. The plaintext
and ciphertext have the same length. Examples of stream ciphers: RC4 and Salsa.
One of the main challenges for secret-key cryptosystems is key distribution: formulate
an efficient method for distributing keys between participating entities [14].
2.2.2 Public-key Cryptography
Public-key cryptography was introduced by Whitfield Diffie and Martin E. Hellman [15].
The main idea is the introduction of mathematically linked key pairs - public key and
secret key -, where a secure public channel can be established by only using public known
information and techniques.
Table 2.1 presents families of public-key cryptosystems, such as key exchange, digital
signature and encryption, exemplified in Examples 2.2.2, 2.2.3 [23] and 2.2.4 [3], respec-
tively.
Table 2.1: Classification of public-key cryptosystems [24].
Key Exchange Technique used for establishing keys between communicating enti-
ties.
Digital Signature Technique used for data origin authentication and non-repudiation.
Encryption Technique used for establishing secure communications (confiden-
tiality).
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Example 2.2.2. Public-key Encryption
Example of public-key encryption, illustrated in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Public-key encryption.
1 Bob generates the key pair: pk (public key) e sk (secret key).
2 Bob publishes the public key pk (public information).
3 Alice acquires the key pk.
4 Alice encrypts the message with the public key pk.
5 Alice sends the encrypted message to Bob.
6 Bob uses the secret key sk to decrypt the message.
The communication is unidirectional. Alice also needs to generate a key pair in order to
receive encrypted messages.
Example 2.2.3. Key Exchange
An example of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm, illustrated in Figure 2.4.
1 Bob chooses an integer a (mod n).
2 Bob computes A = ga.
3 Bob sends A to Alice.
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Figure 2.4: Key exchange.
4 Alice chooses an integer b (mod n).
5 Alice computes B = gb.
6 Alice sends B to Bob.
7 The secret key gab can be computed as gb(a) (Bob) and ga(b) (Alice).
The elements A = ga, B = gb and g becomes public. Computing gab is infeasible and
determines the Diffie-Hellman problem, which is equivalent to the discrete logarithm prob-
lem.
Example 2.2.4. Digital Signature
Generic example of digital signatures, where Bob generates the signature and Alice per-
forms the signature verification, illustrated in Figure 2.5.
1. Bob generates the signature as follows:
1 Generate the secret key sk and public key pk, and publish pk.
2 Compute h = H(m), where h is the result of the hash transformation H applied
on the message m.
3 Compute s = S(sk, h), where S is the signature generation function, with sk
and h as inputs.
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Figure 2.5: Digital signature.
4 m and s becomes public information.
2. Alice verifies the message as follows:
5 Acquire the public key pk and the message m (published by Bob).
6 Compute h = H(m).
7 Compute v = V ( s, pk, h) , where v is the result of the verification function,
with s, pk and h as inputs. Accept the signature iff the verification function
successfully verifies signature.
Hash functions takes a block of data as input and generates a fixed-size bit string hash
value. If the input changes, the hash function generates a different hash value.
Message integrity and origin authentication are security properties provided by digital
signatures.
2.2.3 Secret-key & Public-key Cryptography
Secret-key cryptosystems presents the following pros and cons. Pros: (i) high throughput,
(ii) smaller keys, as shown in Table 2.2, (iii) faster algorithms. Cons: (i) secret keys must
be shared and kept secret within communicating entities, (ii) key management and (iii)
key distribution mechanisms are necessary.
Contrasting secret-key cryptosystems, public-key cryptography presents the following
pros and cons. Pros: (i) the secret key is not shared between communicating entities, (ii)
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digital signature, key exchange and encryption algorithms are possible, (iii) in public-key
encryption systems, the number of keys necessary are less in comparison to secret-key
encryption systems. Cons: (i) the security depends on the difficulty of a mathematical
problem, (ii) slower in comparison to secret-key systems [3].
Table 2.2 shows, for each mathematical problem, the key sizes necessary to achieve a
certain security level. In this context, we are able to draw the following remarks: (i) the
difficulty of the integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems are equivalent, (ii)
the contrast in key sizes between secret-key and public-key systems (to achieve a certain
security level), which also varies depending on the underlying problem.
Table 2.2: Security level of cryptosystems. Source: Paar and Pelzl [24].
Algorithm Cryptosystem
Security Level (bit)
80 128 192 256
Integer Factorization RSA 1024 3072 7068 15360
Discrete Logarithm DH, DSA, Elgamal 1024 3072 7680 15360
Elliptic Curves ECDH, ECDSA 160 256 384 512
Secret-key AES, 3DES 80 128 192 256
2.3 Elliptic Curves
The use of elliptic curves within cryptography was originally independently introduced
by Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller. Essentially, an elliptic curve C is defined by a curve
equation built on a field F for coordinates [25]. In order to understand elliptic curves,
knowledge about group theory [26] and number theory [27] are required.
We start by giving an introduction to finite fields in Section 2.3.1. Then, we explain
elliptic curves and the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem in Sections 2.3.2 and
2.3.3.
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2.3.1 Finite Fields
Fields are abstractions of number systems. Examples of fields are real numbers (R),
complex numbers (C) and rational numbers (Q) [28]. Finite fields are defined by a finite
number of elements (e.g. F2255−19, which is a finite field of size 2255− 19). Definition 2.3.1
gives a more formal definition for fields.
Definition 2.3.1. A field F has the following properties [28]:
1. (F,+) is an abelian group with additive identity denoted by 0.
2. (F\{0}, ·) is an abelian group with multiplicative identity denoted by 1.
3. The distributive law holds: (a+ b) · c = a · c+ b · c for all a, b, c ∈ F .
From Definition 2.3.1, the field F has two operations: addition and multiplication. The
subtraction a−b, s.t. a, b ∈ F , can be written as a−b = a+(−b), where −b is the negative
of b and is unique in F . Division in F can be written as: a, b ∈ F, b 6= 0, a
b
= a · b−1, s.t.
b−1 is the inverse of b and unique in F and b · b−1 = 1.
Prime Fields
Lets consider Fp a prime field of order p. Additions and multiplications are calculated
modulo p. Any integer a, where a ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, ..., p − 1}, a mod p denotes the remainder
r, s.t 0 ≤ r ≤ p− 1 (reduction modulo p).
Example 2.3.1. Arithmetic operations in F29, s.t. {0, 1, 2, 3, ..., 26, 27, 28} represents the
elements in F29:
1. Addition: 17 + 20 = 8⇐⇒ 37mod 29 = 8.
2. Subtraction: 17− 20 = 26⇐⇒ −3mod 29 = 26.
3. Multiplication: 17 · 20 = 21⇐⇒ 340mod 29 = 21.
4. Inversion: 17−1 = 12⇐⇒ 17 · 12mod 29 = 1.
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Binary Fields
The finite field F2m is called a binary field. F2m can be represented as binary polynomials
of degree at most m− 1:
F2m = {am−1zm−1 + am−2zm−2 + · · ·+ a2z2 + a1z1 + a0z0 : ai ∈ {0, 1}}.
Multiplication in F2m is calculated modulo f(z), where f(z) is a irreducible binary
polynomial of degree m. Addition is calculated modulo 2. For any binary polynomial
a(z), a(z) mod f(z) denotes the remainder r(z) of degree less than m, resulted from the
division a(z)/f(z), which is called reduction modulo f(z).
Example 2.3.2. Arithmetic operations for F24, such that the elements {0, 1, z, z+1, z2, z2+
1, z2 + z, z2 + z + 1} ∈ F and f( z) = z3 + z + 1, is given by:
1. Addition: (z2 + z + 1) + (z + 1) = z2 + 2z + 2 = z2.
2. Subtraction: (z2 + z + 1)− (z + 1) = z2.
3. Multiplication: (z2 + z + 1) · (z + 1) = (z3 + 1)mod (z3 + z + 1) = z.
4. Inversion: (z2 + z + 1)−1 = z2 ⇐⇒ (z2 + z + 1) · z2 mod (z3 + z + 1) = 1.
Modular arithmetic (showed in Examples 2.3.1 and 2.3.2) is fundamental for modern
cryptography. It changes the way we compute efficient additions, subtractions, multipli-
cations and inversions in a field F . Common groups for ECC are most primes and binaries
[29].
2.3.2 Elliptic Curves
An elliptic curve E defined over a field F is given by the following equation:
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6,
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where ai are elements in the field F . The set of points in E(Fpk) satisfies the equation
and the single point O at infinity. Coordinates satisfying such equation are tuples (e.g.
affine coordinate system (x, y)) and its elements are in the finite field F . The scalar
multiplication, addition and doubling laws allows arithmetic operations in the elliptic
curve (group law). Elliptic curves have generators and a neutral point denoted ∞ [25].
Weierstrass Curve
Given a finite field F , the Weierstrass curve can be represented by the following equation:
y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6,
with discriminant different than zero (the curve is non-singular).
Montgomery Curve
A Montgomery curve can be represented by the equation:
Ma,b : By2 = x3 + Ax2 + x,
where A,B ∈ F and (A2 − 4) 6= 0.
Twisted Edwards Curve
We expose more details for Twisted Edwards curves, since the Ed25519 scheme is an
instantiation of the EdDSA, which is based on the specified curve.
The Twisted Edwards Curve was introduced in 2008 by Daniel Bernstein and Tanja
Lange [30]. It is given by the equation:
Ee,a,d : ax2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2,
s.t. the following conditions are satisfied:
• The field F is not binary (char(F ) 6= 2).
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• a 6= 0, b 6= 0 and a 6= b.
Arithmetic for twisted Edwards curves can be illustrated as follows [31]:
Point Addition. Consider the points P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2). The addition law










The neutral element is (0, 1) and the negative of (x, y) is (−x, y). The addition formula
is complete and also works for point doubling.
Point Doubling. Consider the point P = Q = (x1, y1) = (x2, y2). The doubling law for































2− ax21 − y21
)
= (x3, y3)
Repeated Doubling. Consider calculating k · P , s.t. P is a point in the curve E and
k = 200. We have [32]:
k · P = 200 · P = 2(2(2(P + 2(2(2(P + 2P ))))))
2.3.3 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
Consider the elliptic curve E defined over a field F and a point P ∈ E(F ), the Elliptic
Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) is represented as Q = l · P , given Q as
multiple of P and l ∈ [0, n − 1], s.t. l = logP Q. If the elliptic curve parameters are
carefully chosen, the ECDLP is infeasible: the best general-purpose attack takes fully
exponential time [28].
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2.4 Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm
Ed25519 is the most popular instance of the Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(EdDSA), and is based on the Curve25519 as twisted Edwards curve, providing ≈ 128-bits
of security. The curve equation is [25]:
ax2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2,
s.t. a = −1 and d = −121665121666 . The curve uses a prime field Fq, where q = 2
255 − 19.
The RFC 8032 document [33] comprises the following advantages of Ed25519:
• High performance in various platforms.
• Generating a random number for each signature is not needed.
• Resilience against side-channel attacks.
• Complete formulas (e.g. addition law): the formula works for all points in the curve.
• Hash collision resistance.
• 128-bit security level.
• Small 32 byte keys and 64 byte signatures.
The EdDSA scheme has eleven carefully selected parameters (they vary between Ed-
DSA signature systems, such as Ed25519 and Ed448). Table 2.3 specifies the main pa-
rameters for the Ed25519 scheme.
Next, we expose details regarding point encoding and decoding, key generation, sig-
nature generation and signature verification [33].
Point encoding. A curve point (x, y) is encoded as a 255-bit little-endian encoding of
y. Then, the least significant bit of x is copied to the most significant bit of the last octet
of the encoded y.
Point decoding. Related to the retrieval of the x coordinate:
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Table 2.3: Ed25519 parameters. Source: RFC 8032 [33].
p 2255 − 19. Defines the underlying field F .
b 256.
Cofactor 8.
Fp encoding (b− 1)-bit little-endian encoding of {0, 1, ..., p− 1}.
H Hash function with 64 byte output (i.e. SHA-512).
d −121665121666 ∈ Fp.
a −1.
B Group generator (x, 45) ∈ E with positive x.
L Group order 2252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493.
1. Interpret the octet string (encoded point) as an integer in little-endian represen-
tation. x0 is the least significant bit of x, which is the most significant bit of the
interpreted string.
2. x is retrieved by computing the square root:
x2 = (y2 − 1)/(dy2 + 1)−1 (mod n),
which is calculated as shown in the next steps.
3. Consider u = y2−1 and v = dy2−a. Compute the candidate root w = (u/v)p+3/8 =
uv3(uv7)(p−5)/8 (mod p).
4. Then, check three cases:
• If vw2 = u (mod p), the square root is x = w.
• If vw2 = −u (mod p), the square root is x = w ∗ 2(p−1)/4.
• Else, the square root modulo p does not exist, and decoding fails.
5. If x = 0 and x0 = 1, decoding fails.
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6. If x (mod 2) = x0, then x = x. Else, x = p− x.
7. Finally, return the decoded point (x, y).
Key generation. The secret key Q and public key A are generated as follows:
1. Generate the b bits secret key Q using a cryptographically secure random number
generator.
2. Hash the secret key: H(Q) = (h0, h1, h2, ..., h2b−1), with an output of size 2b bits
(e.g. SHA-512).
3. We only use the lower 32 bytes of the digest (h0, h1, h2, ..., hb−1) to generate the
public key. Set h0 = h1 = h2 = 0, hb−2 = 1 and hb−1 = 0.
4. After pruning the buffer, interpret the result as a little-endian integer denoted s.
Perform the fixed-base scalar multiplication A = [s]B.
5. The public key A is the encoding of the point A = [s]B.
Signature generation. In order to sign the message M we need both secret and public
keys (Q and A, respectively). The steps for generating the signature (R, S) are described
below:
1. Hash the secret key: H(Q) = (h0, h1, h2, ..., h2b−1), with an output of size 2b (e.g.
SHA-512).
2. We only consider the second half of the digest (hb, hb+1, hb+2, ..., h2b−1) for the next
step.
3. Compute r = H(h ‖M), with an output of size 2b bits.
4. Perform r modulo L, then compute the point R = [r]B. R is the encoding of the
point R = [r]B.
5. Compute the integer s as shown in the key generation algorithm.
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6. Compute k = H(R ‖ A ‖M), then reduce k modulo L.
7. Finally, S = R + k ∗ s.
8. After encoding the point S, return the signature (R ‖ S).
Signature verification. The signature verification takes the public key A and the
message m as inputs and tries to verify the signature (R, S):
1. Decode the first half of the signature as a point R. Then, decode the second half as
an integer S. Reject the signature if the decoding fails.
2. Check that the integer S is in the range 0 ≤ S ≤ L. Reject the signature if it fails.
3. Decode the public key A as a point A. Reject the signature if it fails.
4. Compute k = H(R ‖ A ‖M) as a 64 byte little-endian integer.
5. The signature is valid if the following is true: [S]B ?= R + [k]A.
Figure 2.6 presents an overview for Ed25519. The Ed25519 Protocol comprises opera-
tions (i.e. key generation, signing and verification) that are implemented over a group of
points on an Elliptic Curve. Which, in its turn, is defined by the selected Finite Field (e.g.
F2255−19). It is important to correctly implement the underlying mathematical structure
and EdDSA protocol, so that undesired behaviors do not propagate into the Application.
Specific optimizations techniques can be implemented depending on the features that the
underlying Platform provides.
2.5 Conclusions
This chapter has showed the background theory for cryptography and elliptic curves.
We have also introduced Rust, a fast and safe programming language. For last, we have
explained the Ed25519 signature algorithm and provided an overview of a implementation
project involving Ed25519.
Figure 2.6: Ed25519 project stack.
Chapter 3
Related Work
There is a vast amount of work related to Ed25519 implementations and cryptographic
performance and security analysis. We do not attempt to find and study all applicable
works. Instead, we described some of the major Ed25519 implementations displayed
in [34] (Section 3.1). Next, we focused on works that evaluated - performance wise -
cryptographic implementations (Section 3.2). Lastly, we gathered works that verifies
Ed25519’s security (Section 3.3). Section 3.4 summarizes the main ideas presented in this
chapter.
3.1 Ed25519 Implementation
This section presents existing implementations of the Ed25519 signature algorithm.
3.1.1 ed25519-dalek
The ed25519-dalek library [8] provides a Rust implementation of Ed25519 key generation,
signing and verification. The implementation was built on top of the Curve25519 im-
plementation curve25519-dalek. The curve25519-dalek library implements u32, u64, avx2
and ifma backends. Safety features include constant-time logic, zeroisation of sensitive
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data, memory safety and no invalid points. Although security is prioritized, the imple-
mentation is very fast. The library offers serialization to/from bytes for secret and public
keys and signatures, as well as batch signature verification.
3.1.2 ed25519-donna
ed25519-donna [7] offers fast and constant-time 32-bit and 64-bit implementations of
Ed25519. It also leverages SSE2 instruction sets and offers batch signature verification.
It is possible to disable compilation against OpenSSL and use a custom hash function
instead.
3.1.3 ed25519-java
The ed25519-java [9] implementation is based on the ref10 implementation in SUPER-
COP. This implementation uses radix-225,26 and provides a fast and constant-time port
of the radix-251 operations in ref10, as well as a generic version using BigIntegers.
3.1.4 crypto/ed25519
The crypto/ed25519 [35] package implements the Ed25519 algorithm in Go, compatible
with RFC 8032. The code is a port of the ref10 implementation in SUPERCOP and uses
the radix-225,26 representation.
3.1.5 PyNaCl
PyNaCl [36] is a Python binding to libsodium, providing digital signatures, secret-key and
public-key encryption, hashing, message authentication and key derivation. libsodium [37]
is a portable, cross-compilable, installable and packageable fork of NaCl. The Libsodium
library includes optimized Curve25519 implementations for 32-bit and 64-bit platforms,
as well as a vectorized assembly implementation for SIMD architectures.
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3.2 Performance Evaluation
ECC has been heavily considered for securing resource constrained devices due to its
smaller signatures and key sizes and faster computation. TinyECC [38] is a configurable
library for ECC operations in wireless sensors networks. Such configuration allows dif-
ferent combinations of optimizations that have different RAM and ROM consumption,
execution time and energy consumption. The evaluation of the TinyECC library included
resource consumption and performance measurements analysis on a range of sensor plat-
forms. The metrics used were the following: ROM and RAM consumption, execution
time and energy consumption. Regarding optimization techniques, there were six in to-
tal, namely the Barrett reduction, hybrid multiplication and hybrid squaring, projective
coordinate systems, sliding window for scalar multiplications, Shamir’s trick and curve
specific optimization. The best configuration for storage and computational efficiency
were presented.
HACL [4] is a modern C cryptographic library that implements the ChaCha20 and
Salsa20 encryption algorithms, Poly1305 and HMAC message authentication, SHA-256
and SHA-512 hash functions, Curve25519, and the Ed25519 signature system. The code
verification considered memory safety, timing side-channels and functional correctness
with respect to RFC specifications. The authors also stated the library’s compatibil-
ity with NaCl, TLS and Mozilla’s NSS. Regarding the performance evaluation, the au-
thors performed benchmarks on 32-bit and 64-bit platforms, using the CPU performance
counter for measuring the average number of cycles needed to perform a typical oper-
ation. HACL was compared against OpenSSL, Libsodium and TweetNaCl. HACL’s
Ed25519 implementation proved to be much faster than TweetNaCl’s, but slower com-
pared to the others, since precomputed tables were not used. An important remark is the
use of 64x64 bit multiplications resulting in 128-bit integers, which improves performance
on supporting platforms.
3.3. SECURITY VERIFICATION 29
3.3 Security Verification
Chalkias et al. [34] analyzes the security of Ed25519 implementations and standardization.
The analysis is based on inconsistencies and incompatibilities in batch and single signature
verification, binding and malleability guarantees and ambiguity in verification equations.
The paper also emphasizes the convergence to a single interoperable Ed25519 scheme by
considering security properties, such as repudiation resilience and strong unforgeability.
It also approaches conflicting variants of Ed25519 implementations and correctness defi-
nitions, as well as recommendations, procedures and practical tools for choosing/building
Ed25519 applications that aim for compatibility and offer a higher security notion. Sim-
ilarly, Brendel et al. [39] helps with the understanding of Ed25519 variants and its prop-
erties. Therefore, the authors provide detailed analysis and security proofs for existential
and strong unforgeability and resilience against key substitution attacks.
Bernstein et al. [40] focuses on the security analysis of the NaCl cryptographic library.
More specifically, the security impact of NaCl’s design features, such as no data flow
from secrets to load addresses, no data flow from secrets to branch conditions; no padding
oracles; centralizing randomness; avoiding unnecessary randomness; extremely high speed;
and cryptographic primitives chosen conservatively in light of the cryptanalytic literature,
were evaluated. Hence, these features are essential for the design of cryptographic libraries.
3.4 Conclusions
This chapter presented existing Ed25519 implementations and works that evaluated cryp-
tographic libraries with regards to security and performance.
After doing a superficial analysis of Ed25519 implementations we have learned the
following:
• Platform based optimizations, such as implementations tailored for 32-bit, 64-bit
and SIMD architectures.
• Easy to use and misuse resistant interfaces.
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• Readability and documentation leads to better code auditing and maintainability.
• Constant-time operations, memory safety, performance and resource consumption.
We were also able to understand security in two dimensions. (i) Ed25519 algo-
rithm: procedures taken to offer security properties, such as strong unforgeability, non-
repudiation and backwards-compatibility. (ii) Ed25519 implementation: prevent side-
channel attacks by implementing constant-time operations; functional correctness. In
terms of performance, ECC implementations can leverage optimization techniques with
varying levels of resource consumption and execution time. Therefore, efficiency must





This chapter describes the approach used to implement the Ed25519 signature system in
Rust and the analysis process of Ed25519 security and performance. We organized this
chapter in three sections. Section 4.1 describes the implementation process. Section 4.2
defines the methods for performing the analysis of the Ed25519 implementation and Rust.
Finally, Section 4.3 summarizes this chapter.
4.1 Implementation
The process of transforming mathematical techniques into code is not an easy task. The
ultimate goal of creating another Ed25519 implementation in Rust was to comprehend
and document the process and the path taken to achieve our goals.
The Ed25519 system refers to the implementation of the following modules: field
element arithmetic, group element arithmetic and an interface defining the cryptographic
operations (key generation, signature generation and signature verification).
The implementation process consisted of a theoretical study of the signature system
and the Rust programming language, followed by the implementation itself:
• Step 1 (theory): perform a study related to the Ed25519 signature system and
the Rust programming language.
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The study includes materials and documentations provided by existing implemen-
tations: namely the ed25519-dalek [8], ed25519-java [9] and ed25519-donna [7]. As
well as articles and books, specially the original work [1] and the RFC 8032 [33].
The Rust community provides excellent documentations (i.e. The Rustonomicon
[41]), fundamental to the success of this work.
• Step 2 (implementation): implement each layer in the following sequence, start-
ing from the field element arithmetic, group element arithmetic and lastly, the key
generation, signature and verification functions. The implementation should include
aspects of readability, modularity and ease of use.
• Step 3 (tests): test the implementation in two ways.
Unit testing. Ensure appropriate behavior for functions (i.e. underlying arithmetic
for field elements and group elements).
Regression testing. This can be achieved by testing the output of the key gen-
eration, signature generation and signature verification functions by consuming the
test vectors available in [42].
• Step 4 (library API): build an appropriate interface for our Rust library.
This step involves the implementation of an interface that provides the function-
ality of the Ed25519 signing algorithm. The interface should have the following
characteristics:
– Design an interface similar to existing Ed25519 implementations, such as the
ed25519-dalek [8] library.
– Provide clear documentation for data types and functions with examples re-
garding its usage.
– Use Rust’s type system to ensure that the signature, public key and secret key
are distinguishable from each other. In other words, they are essentially arrays
of bytes with another level of abstraction.
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• Step 5 (documentation): The goal of the documentation is an overview of the
Ed25519 algorithm and the exploration of its mathematical perspective reflected in
the implementation. Thus, the documentation comprises the following:
– Overview of the Ed25519 signing algorithm.
– Describe the implementation, specially its structure, interface and general de-
cisions considered in the development process, as well as explore core functions
and its mathematical perspective when applicable.
4.2 Analysis
Lastly, we carried out a study of security and performance involving the Ed25519 algo-
rithm and implementation.
4.2.1 Performance Evaluation
All benchmarks were performed in an IntelR CoreTM i7-9750H Processor (64-bit) running
Ubuntu 20.04 5.8.0-53-generic (64-bit)(with 16 GiB of RAM). Ultimately, our goal is
to measure the performance of Ed25519 implementations with different configurations.
We specially want to evaluate Rust’s performance. In order to evaluate performance we
considered the execution time and memory consumption:
Execution speed. The execution speed was measured using benchmarking libraries
built for that specific language. We give special attention when comparing Rust and
C implementations, considering that C is a fast programming language. Thus, we use
Rust’s Foreign Function Interface (FFI) to communicate with C cryptographic libraries.
Consequently, two main factors arises. The first is the possibility to use the same bench-
marking library to evaluate both C and Rust libraries. Second, this is a fair comparison
if we consider that the overhead introduced is negligible [43]–[45]. Also, Table 4.1 shows
similar execution times when comparing Rust’s FFI with C’s clock() function.
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Table 4.1: Comparison between two benchmarking techniques: call C functions from Rust
using FFI; native in C using the clock() function (using the ed25519-donna implementa-
tion).
ed25519-donna With FFI (µs) Without FFI (µs)
Key Generation 10.215 10.682
Signature Generation 11.279 11.317
Signature Verification 36.436 35.975
Memory consumption. We used Valgrind’s Massif1 tool to measure the memory con-
sumption of programs that included all three Ed25519 operations (this was done for each
implementation we selected).
Experiment Setup (execution speed)
The Ed25519 system involves three main operations: key and signature generation and
signature verification. Therefore, these operations were the focus of our benchmarks.
To understand the impact of optimizations, we adopt two variables:
• Architecture: 32-bit or 64-bit implementations.
• Scalar multiplication: use of precomputed data to speed up scalar multiplications.
We also choose major Ed25519 implementations [34] in the following programming
languages: C, Go, Rust, Java and Python. Ten implementations were selected in total,
and are listed in Table 4.2. Table 4.2 also presents the main features provided by the
implementation, as well as the benchmarking library.
Table 4.2: Ed25519 implementations used in the performance evaluation, as well as a
description of the benchmarking libraries used, such as criterion, timeit, testing and JMH.
Benchmarking Environment
1https://www.valgrind.org/docs/manual/ms-manual.html
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C and Rust/criterion library: collects 100 samples in estimated 5s of execution 3s of
warmup. Each sample contains a different number of iterations (criterion does not analyze
individual iterations).
Python/timeit library: used to collect the average execution time from at least 5s of execution,
this was repeated three times and the lowest measurement was considered.
Go/testing package: default configurations 100.000 iterations.




Environment: rustc version 1.53.0-nightly criterion version 0.3.
Library: ed25519-dalek version 1.0.1 [8].
Features: 32-bit 64-bit SIMD instructions.
Environment: rustc version 1.53.0-nightly criterion version 0.3.
Library: ed25519-java version 0.3.0 [9].
Features: 32-bit.
Environment: JDK version 14.0.1 JMH version 1.28.
Library: Go package crypto/ed25519 [35].
Features: 32-bit.
Environment: Go version 1.16 Go package testing.
Library: ed25519 (oasisprotocol) [47].
Features: 32-bit 64-bit.
Environment: Go version 1.16 Go package testing.
Library: Bouncy Castle version 1.68 [48].
Features: 32-bit.
Environment: JDK version 14.0.1 JMH version 1.28.
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Library: ed25519 (orlp) [49].
Features: 32-bit.
Environment: GCC version 9.3.0 Library time.h for clock_t clock(void) function Rust
crates (FFI): libc version 0.2 criterion version 0.3.
Library: ed25519-donna [7].
Features: 32-bit 64-bit SSE2 instructions.
Environment: GCC version 9.3.0 Library time.h for clock_t clock(void) function Rust
crates (FFI): libc version 0.2 criterion version 0.3.
Library: PyNaCl version 1.4.0 [36].
Features: 32-bit 64-bit SIMD instructions.
Environment: Python version 3.8.5 Python library timeit.
Library: pyca version 4.1 [50].
Features: 64-bit.
Environment: Python version 3.8.5 Python library timeit.
To simplify, we create three scenarios. In the first two scenarios we perform bench-
marks that reflects the impact of the optimizations. The third scenario presents bench-
marks for all selected implementations. These benchmarks were applied for all of the
Ed25519 operations (namely key generation, signing and verification).
Experiment Setup (memory consumption)
We used Valgrind’s Massif (version 3.15.0) to measure memory consumption of programs,
such that each program used a specific Ed25519 library and included key generation,
signing and verification functions pertaining to that library. The --pages-as-heap option
replaces heap profiling for lower-level page profiling: the stack, heap, data and BSS seg-
ments are all measured; the --stacks option, in the other hand, measures the stack and
the heap. Both options were used in the performance analysis.
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4.2.2 Security
To gain more insights into the features of the Ed25519 signature system/implementation
and what makes Rust a suitable language for cryptographic implementations, we also
performed a study focused on security properties. Straightforwardly, we discussed security
in three perspectives:
1. Implementation: discussion of security considerations in the implementation level,
such as constant-time operations.
2. Programming language: discussion of Rust’s safety features.
3. Algorithm: classification of our implementation in respect to the security properties
exposed by Brendel et al. [39] and Chalkias et al. [34].
4.3 Conclusions
As stated in this chapter, this work focuses on the Ed25519 implementation in Rust and its
analysis. The implementation is composed by the comprehension of the theory, Ed25519
implementation in Rust and the documentation. The analysis targets the implementa-




This chapter focuses on the implementation details (the implementation can be found
in GitHub1) and is organized as follows. Section 5.1 describes the implementation itself
(field arithmetic, curve arithmetic and protocol). Section 5.2 expands on implementation
properties, such as modularity, readability and ease of use. Unit testing and regression
testing are presented in Section 5.3. The interface was exemplified in Section 5.4. Lastly,
Section 5.5 summarizes this chapter.
5.1 Implementation
The implementation can be divided as: field element, group element and interface. They
are presented in Sections 5.1.1, 5.1.2 and 5.1.3, respectively.
5.1.1 Field Element Arithmetic
This section describes the field element representation and arithmetic, i.e. the radix-251





Considering the goal to reduce the number of instructions when performing field ele-
ment arithmetic and the inability to perform 255-bit integer arithmetic on mainstream
computers, we take an element x of field F2255−19 as five 64-bit limbs (x0, x1, x2, x3, x4) :
x = ∑4i=0 xi251i [1].
x is represented as:
x = x0 + x1251 + x22102 + x32153 + x42204, with 0 ≤ xi ≤ 251.
Addition and Subtraction
Field Element additions can be done simply by performing limb by limb addition. Dealing
with carries is not necessary. The reason lies on the absence of large addition chains.
One addition and one subtraction for each limb is needed to perform subtraction on
field elements. Since we are storing them as 64-bit unsigned, in order to avoid underflow
we first add a multiple of p (e.g. k ·p), and then perform the subtraction: s = (x+k ·p)−y.
Listing 5.1 shows the code that performs the subtraction.
Listing 5.1: Subtraction on field elements.
1 let mut h = [0u64; 5];
2
3 // Perform h = self - g
4 // The element [twoP0, TwoP1234, TwoP1234, TwoP1234, TwoP1234] is a multiple
5 // of p: 2 * (2^255 - 19).
6 h[0] = (self.0[0] + TwoP0) - g.0[0];
7 h[1] = (self.0[1] + TwoP1234) - g.0[1];
8 h[2] = (self.0[2] + TwoP1234) - g.0[2];
9 h[3] = (self.0[3] + TwoP1234) - g.0[3];
10 h[4] = (self.0[4] + TwoP1234) - g.0[4];
11
12 // Perform field element reduction
13 FieldElement::reduce(h)
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Multiplication
The result of the multiplication of two field elements x and y, z = x·y = z0+z1251+z22102+
· · · + z82408, can be obtained as follows. By exposing that p = 2255 − 19 −→ 2255 ≡ ( 19
mod p) , Equation 5.1 is straightforward [1].
z = ( z0 + 19z5) + ( z1 + 19z6) 251 + ( z2 + 19z7) 2102 + ( z3 + 19z8) 2153 + z42204 (5.1)
z0 = x0y0
z1 = x0y1 + x1y0
z2 = x0y2 + x1y1 + x2y0
z3 = x0y3 + x1y2 + x2y1 + x3y0
z4 = x0y4 + x1y3 + x2y2 + x3y1 + x4y0
z5 = x1y4 + x2y3 + x3y2 + x4y1
z6 = x2y4 + x3y3 + x4y2
z7 = x3y4 + x4y3
z8 = x4y4 (5.2)
From Equations 5.1 and 5.2 we can deduce Equation 5.3.
z0 = x0y0 + 19(x0y4 + x2y3 + x3y2 + x4y1)
z1 = x0y1 + x1y0 + 19(x2y4 + x3y3 + x4y2)
z2 = x0y2 + x1y1 + x2y0 + 19(x3y4 + x4y3)
z3 = x0y3 + x1y2 + x2y1 + x3y0 + 19(x4y4)
z4 = x0y4 + x1y3 + x2y2 + x3y1 + x4y0 (5.3)
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In order to obtain coefficients that are slightly larger than 251, reduce (dealing with
carries) is necessary after performing multiplications [51]. The same approach is applied
to field element squaring (Section 5.1.1). Listing 5.2 shows the Rust code for field mul-
tiplication, which reflects Equation 5.3. It is important to note that inner field element
(u64 limbs) multiplications are performed as (f as u128) · (g as u128), where both f and
g are u64.
Listing 5.2: Field multiplication modulo p
1 let h0 = f0g0 + f1g4_19 + f2g3_19 + f3g2_19 + f4g1_19;
2 let mut h1 = f0g1 + f1g0 + f2g4_19 + f3g3_19 + f4g2_19;
3 let mut h2 = f0g2 + f1g1 + f2g0 + f3g4_19 + f4g3_19;
4 let mut h3 = f0g3 + f1g2 + f2g1 + f3g0 + f4g4_19;
5 let mut h4 = f0g4 + f1g3 + f2g2 + f3g1 + f4g0;
Squaring
Field element squaring is similar to its multiplication. We have z = x · x = z0 + z1251 +
z22102 + · · · + z82408 and p = 2255 − 19 −→ 2255 ≡ ( 19 mod p) . Equation 5.4 describes
the operation x · x.
z0 = 2 · x0
z1 = x0x1 + x1x0
z2 = x0x2 + 2 · x1 + x2x0
z3 = x0x3 + x1x2 + x2x1 + x3x0
z4 = x0x4 + x1x3 + 2 · x2 + x3x1 + x4x0
z5 = x1x4 + x2x3 + x3x2 + x4x1
z6 = x2x4 + 2 · x3 + x4x2
z7 = x3x4 + x4x3
z8 = 2 · x4 (5.4)
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Equations 5.1 and 5.4 generates the limbs z0, . . . , z4 illustrated in Equation 5.5.
z0 = 2 · x0 + 19(2 · x1x4 + 2 · x2x3)
z1 = 2 · x0x1 + 19( 2 · x2x4 + 2 · x3)
z2 = 2 · x0x2 + 2 · x1 + 19( 2 · x3x4)
z3 = 2 · x0x3 + 2 · x1x2 + 19( 2 · x4)
z4 = 2 · x0x4 + 2 · x1x3 + 2 · x2 (5.5)
Reduce is also necessary to obtain coefficients that are slightly larger than 251, similarly
to field element multiplications.
Inversion
For field element inversion we have ap ∼= a mod p and therefore a(p−2) ∼= a−1 mod p.
More specifically we will simply compute a2255−21 mod p. This can be achieved by per-
forming sequences of squaring and multiplications. For example:
• Square field element a: b = a · a = a2.
• Square field element b: c = b · b = a4.
• Multiply a and b: d = a2 · a4 = a6.
• Square field element d: e = d · d = ( a6) 2 = a24−22 .
Listing 5.3 shows (partially) the code that performs the field element inversion.
Listing 5.3: Field element inversion.
1 ...
2 ...
3 // 1 * 2 = 2 -> self^2
4 let mut t0 = self.square();
5 // 2 * 2 = 4 -> self^4
6 let mut t1 = t0.square();
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7 // 4 * 2 = 8 -> self^8
8 t1 = t1.square();
9 // 1 + 8 = 9 -> self^9
10 t1 = self.mul(t1);
11 // 2 + 9 = 11 -> self^11
12 t0 = t0.mul(t1);
13 // 2 * 11 = 22 -> self^22
14 let mut t2 = t0.square();
15 // 22 + 9 = 31 -> self^31
16 t1 = t1.mul(t2);
17 // 31 * 2 = 62 = 2^6 - 2^1 -> self^(2^6 - 2)
18 t2 = t1.square();
19 // 2^4 * (2^6 - 2^1) = 2^10 - 2^5 -> self^(2^10 - 32)
20 t2 = t2.square_times(4);
21 ...
22 ...
23 // Perform squarings and multiplications until self^(2^255 - 21)
5.1.2 Group Element Arithmetic
In this section we aim for expanding details about group arithmetic, i.e. coordinate
systems, point addition, point doubling and scalar multiplication.
Coordinate Systems
Alternate coordinate systems are considered for performing point arithmetic.




The identity element is (0 : 1 : 1 : 0) and the negative element is (−X : Y : Z : −T ).
The point (x, y) in the projective coordinate system (P 2) is represented as:
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x = X/Z
y = Y/Z,
where Z 6= 0.
The precomputed representation is defined as (y + x, y − x, 2 ∗ d ∗ x ∗ y), where d is
the constant (Ed25519 parameter) −121665/121666 (mod p). The precomputed values
(precomp.rs) used in scalar multiplications are points in the precomputed representation.
The cached representation also uses precomputations, satisfying (Y +X, Y −X,Z, 2 ∗
d ∗ T ) (X, Y , Z and T are values extracted from the P 3 representation).
Finally, the completed (P × P ) representation ((X : Z), (Y : T )) satisfies x = X/Z
and y = Y/T .
Addition and Subtraction
Addition and subtraction were implemented for points X and Y as X ⊕Y , where X is in
the extended point representation and Y can either be in the precomputed or cached rep-
resentations. The result of the operation is returned as P ×P (completed representation).
The code is available in the Appendix B.
Doubling
Doubling the point X requires performing X + X. The point X can either be in the
extended or projective representation, and the result is returned as P × P (completed
representation). The code is available in the Appendix B.
Fixed-window Scalar Multiplication
Two approaches were considered for scalar multiplications: one approach uses fixed win-
dows and the other one uses sliding windows (Section 5.1.2). We will go through the
constant-time fixed window approach in this section.
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We consider a fixed window of size 4. The following needs to be computed:
S = a ∗ P,
s.t. a is defined as a0 + a1 · 2561 + a2 · 2562 · · · a31 · 25631 and P is the base point.
For point P we precompute the following table:
P 2 · P 3 · P · · · 8 · P
162 256 · P 2 · 256 · P 3 · 256 · P · · · 8 · 256 · P
164 2562 · P 2 · 2562 · P 3 · 2562 · P · · · 8 · 2562 · P
166 2563 · P 2 · 2563 · P 3 · 2563 · P · · · 8 · 2563 · P
... ... ... ... . . .
1662 25631 · P 2 · 25631 · P 3 · 25631 · P · · · 8 · 25631 · P
Then, compute the radix-24 representation for the scalar a:
a = a0 + a1 · 161 + a2 · 162 + · · ·+ a63 · 1663,
where −8 ≤ ai < 8 and 0 ≤ |ai| ≤ 8. Therefore, instead of doing precomputations for
P . . . 16P , only P . . . 8P precomputations were generated. This is possible by using signed
values for ai and transforming the resulting point (ai · 16j · P ) into its negative whenever
ai is negative.
The scalar multiplication can be solved by iterating through a and accumulating each
ai · 16j ·P . It is important to note that we accumulate odd indexes first and multiply the
result by 16. Although performing the scalar multiplication with the lookup table uses
more memory, it is much faster. The code for the fixed-window scalar multiplication can
be found in Appendix C.
48 CHAPTER 5. ED25519 IMPLEMENTATION
Sliding-window Scalar Multiplication
The goal is to compute the following:
S = a · P,
where a = a0 + a1 · 256 + a2 · 2562 + · · ·+ a31 · 25631 and P is a point in the curve.
In contrast to the fixed-window scalar multiplication, the sliding-window scalar mul-
tiplication is used for verifying signatures. It uses less memory but is not constant-time.
The idea is to “slide” the window over the scalar [52]. The following steps were
implemented:
1. First, a is passed to the slide function. The function slide takes the parameter a,
which has 32 8-bit unsigned elements (a1, a2, ..., a31), and returns r.
2. r has 256 8-bit signed elements and is defined as: r0 +r1 ·21 +r2 ·22 + · · ·+r255 ·2255.
Each element ri ∈ {−15,−13,−11,−9,−7,−5,−3,−1, 0, 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15}.
3. Then, since ri is always odd, we precompute values for the point P : {P, 3P, 5P,
7P, 9P, 11P, 13P, 15P}.
4. Lastly, perform the chain of point doublings and additions in r, and accumulate the
result after each operation.
Although the sliding-window method is more efficient, it is not constant-time and is
only used for verifying signatures. The code can be found in Appendix D.
5.1.3 Interface
Fundamentally, the interface should have at least three operations: key generation, signa-
ture generation and signature verification. These operations are illustrated in Figures 5.1
and 5.2. Both diagrams reflect the steps described in Section 2.4. It is important to
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observe a few things about the design illustrated in both figures: Ed25519 performs secret
key clamping (set/clear bits); signing also depends on the public key; verification also
depends on checks and point decoding validations [39].
Figure 5.1: Overview of Ed25519’s key generation and signature generation.
Further details about the usage of the library API (code examples) and a description
of the Ed25519 algorithm (showing the key generation, signing and verification processes)
were given in Sections 5.4 and 2.4, respectively.
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5.2 Implementation Properties
The properties considered for the implementation were three: modularity, readability and
ease of use.
Figure 5.2: Overview of Ed25519’s signature verification.
5.2.1 Modularity
The implementation was organized as follows:
























The implementation was organized similarly to the ed25519-java implementation. The
library was divided in three parts. (i) Built-in benchmarks for key generation, signing
and verification were included in the /benches folder. (ii) /src comprises the Ed255519
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implementation. (iii) /tests includes the regression testing. The /src folder was organized
as follows:
Curve25519. The module /curve25519 houses the implementation of the field element
arithmetic, group element arithmetic and scalar operations.
Ed25519. The modules keypair.rs, public.rs, secret.rs and signature.rs implements the
specification for the secret key, public key and signature, as well as the implementation
of the Ed25519 protocol. To do so, it uses the /curve25519 module.
5.2.2 Readability
In this case, we refer to readability simply as the appropriate attribution of names. To
exemplify, the code in Listing 5.4, which returns a point in P 3 representation given a 32
byte encoding enc, illustrates two main characteristics. First, names given to functions
are easily associated with the arithmetic applied to the field element. Second, names
given to variables follows the same pattern introduced by the RFC 8032 and articles.
Listing 5.4: Point decoding.
1 pub fn decode(enc: [u8; 32]) -> Option<P3> {
2 let y = FieldElement::decode(enc);
3 let yy = y.square();
4 let u = yy - FieldOne;
5 let v = (yy * D) + FieldOne;
6 let v3 = v.square() * v;
7 let v7 = v3.square() * v;
8 let mut x = u * v7;
9 x = x.pow22523();
10 x = x * u * v3;
11 let vxx = x.square() * v;
12 let mut check = vxx - u;
13 if check.is_zero().unwrap_u8() == 0u8 {
14 check = vxx + u;
15 if check.is_zero().unwrap_u8() == 0u8 {
16 return None;
17 }
18 x = x * I;
19 }
20
21 if x.is_negative().unwrap_u8() == enc[31] >> 7 {
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29 T: x * y,
30 })
31 }
5.2.3 Ease of Use
We associate ease of use with the library interface and code examples.
Code examples. Proper usage of the library were exposed in this documentation and
on the root of the GitHub repository. Also, complete examples were written as Rust
comments (for data types and functions).
Library API. As for the library interface, we provided distinct Rust types for each
element: SecretKey for secret keys, PublicKey for public keys, Signature for signatures,
and Keypair for both secret and public keys. The interface has similarities with the
ed25519-dalek implementation. In this context, the Keypair type implements both signing
and verification functions, SecretKey implements the signing function, and PublicKey
implements the verification function. Therefore, using distinct types to represent different
elements (even though these elements are all byte arrays), and functions implemented
under the correct types, are essential for the usability of the library and to increase the
difficulty of misusing the API.
5.3 Tests
Tests were applied for internal functions and Ed25519 operations. We classified them as:
Unit testing. Written mainly for field elements (field_element.rs), group elements
(group_element.rs), scalar operations (scalar_ops.rs) and utilitarian functions (utils.rs).
Tests were done using random inputs. The goal was to ensure basic functionality by
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generating the correct output.
Regression testing. Regression tests were written for key generation, signing and ver-
ification functions. Tests were taken from [42]. Essentially, the test vectors have 1024
instances, each containing a message, secret and public keys, and the corresponding sig-
nature. Therefore, the key generation, signature generation and signature verification
functions were tested. The output from each operation was matched against the test
vectors.
5.4 Library API
Key generation. The secret key and public key are generated using the generation
function from Keypair, as shown in Listing 5.5.
Listing 5.5: Example of secret key and public key generation.
1 let keypair: Keypair = Keypair::generate();
Signature generation. Signing is done through the sign function from Keypair, as
shown in Listing 5.6.
Listing 5.6: Example of signature generation.
1 let message: &[u8] = b"";
2 let signature: Signature = keypair.sign(message);
Signature verification. In order to verify signatures we use the verify function from
Keypair, as shown in Listing 5.7.
Listing 5.7: Example of signature verification.
1 let signok: bool = keypair.verify(message, signature);
Listing 5.8 provides a full example using our library.
Listing 5.8: Example using the library API.
1 extern crate ed25519_fun;
2 use ed25519_fun::{Keypair, Signature, SecretKey, PublicKey};
3
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4 fn main() {
5 // Keypair generation
6 let keypair: Keypair = Keypair::generate();
7
8 // Signing
9 let message: &[u8] = b"";
10 let signature: Signature = keypair.sign(message);
11
12 // Verification
13 let signok: bool = keypair.verify(message, signature);
14
15 // The Keypair can also be generated with the secret key
16 let secret_key: SecretKey = keypair.secret;
17 let keypair_from_secret_key = Keypair::generate_public_key(secret_key);
18
19 // Signing can also be performed with SecretKey
20 let public_key: PublicKey = Keypair.public;
21 let secret_key_signing: Signature = secret_key.sign(public_key, message);
22
23 // Verification can also be performed with PublicKey
24 let public_key_signok = public_key.verify(message, signature);
25
26 // Transform Keypair, SecretKey, PublicKey and Signature into byte arrays
27 let keypair_bytes: [u8; 64] = keypair.as_bytes();
28 let secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = secret_key.as_bytes();
29 let public_bytes: [u8; 32] = public_key.as_bytes();
30 let signature_bytes: [u8; 64] = signature.as_bytes();
31
32 // Transform byte arrays into its corresponding types
33 let keypair_from_bytes: Keypair = Keypair::from_bytes(&keypair_bytes);
34 let secret_key_from_bytes: SecretKey = SecretKey::from_bytes(&secret_bytes);
35 let public_key_from_bytes: PublicKey = PublicKey::from_bytes(&public_bytes);
36 let signature_from_bytes: Signature = Signature::from_bytes(&signature_bytes);
37 }
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter described the implementation of the signature scheme. For simplicity, we
have only explored the main ideas and functions surrounding the underlying arithmetic.
Then, we attempted to explain the properties we chose to consider in the implementation:
modularity, readability and ease of use. They are simple concepts that resulted in writing
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code that is easier to read and maintain, and in a usable interface. Lastly, we described




Performance and Security Analysis
This chapter focuses on the aspects of performance and security in two perspectives: Rust
programming language and Ed25519 implementation and algorithm. Section 6.1 evaluates
Ed25519 implementations by measuring the execution time of the key generation, signing
and verification functions, as well as the memory footprint. Next, Section 6.2 explores
Rust’s and Ed25519’s security.
6.1 Evaluation
We observed the impact of precomputed values in scalar multiplications, as well as 32-bit
and 64-bit implementations in Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2, respectively. Then, we analyzed
our benchmark results for various implementations in Section 6.1.3. Lastly, Section 6.1.4
shows memory consumption. The code can be found in GitHub1.
6.1.1 Scalar Multiplication
First, we take look at the impact of precomputed values, explained at Section 5.1.2. As
shown in Table 6.1, the use of precomputed values in scalar multiplications can drastically




are the most expensive operation in ECC arithmetic. Our results indicated an increase
in performance by 81.77% and 78.87% in key and signature generation, respectively.
Table 6.1: Performance impact of 30 KB of precomputed values (with our implementa-
tion).
ed25519-fun With Precomputation (µs) Without Precomputation (µs)
Key Generation 21.065 115.99
Signature Generation 25.294 120.05
By using precomputed values, we perform 128 table lookups and 128 point additions.
Otherwise, 512 point additions are necessary.
6.1.2 Architecture
This time, we consider the difference in performance for 32-bit and 64-bit implementations
of Ed25519. Essentially, 64-bit implementations breaks field elements into 5 limbs using
radix 251. 32-bit implementations, in the other hand, breaks them into 10 limbs using
the radix-2{25,26} representation. Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 show that performance halves
(performance decreases by a factor of 2) for key generation, signing and verification when
building the library for 32-bit targets. Which is expected, considering that the field
element arithmetic is optimized for specific radix-β number representations. Because we
wanted to emphasize the difference in performance for radix-β representations, we decided
to exclude our implementation, which only supports the 64-bit version.
6.1.3 Overall
We now focus on performance comparisons between Ed25519 implementations in the
following languages: Rust, C, Python, Java and Go.
Rust’s performance. The C language is known to be fast and efficient. Thus, we set
ed25519-donna as a performance baseline. For all Ed25519 operations, our implemen-
tation (ed25519-fun) has performed as well as the ed25519-donna implementation with
similar optimization configurations. Also, it outperformed both Java implementations,
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Go’s crypto library and ed25519 (orlp), likely due to different field element representa-
tions and optimizations choices.
Figure 6.1: Key generation benchmarks involving 32-bit and 64-bit builds of three
Ed25519 implementations.
Figure 6.2: Signature generation benchmarks involving 32-bit and 64-bit builds of three
Ed25519 implementations.
The following observations derived from Figures 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6, which illustrates the
execution time (in microseconds) for the selected implementations:
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Figure 6.3: Signature verification benchmarks involving 32-bit and 64-bit builds of three
Ed25519 implementations.
• ed25519-dalek’s experimental SIMD backend has the best signature verification per-
formance.
• ed25519-donna with SSE2 instruction sets offers the fastest key generation and
signature generation.
• Rust is capable of matching C’s performance. ed25519-fun and ed25519-donna, for
instance, shows similar performance of key generation and signature generation.
The same can be applied for implementations written in Go, which is known for
being efficient and reliable. ed25519 (oasis), for example, has great performance for
key generation (14.068 µs) and signature generation (14.921 µs).
• pynacl is a Python binding to libsodium, and pyca, in the other hand, is a Python
binding to OpenSSL. We assume that the added overhead (binding) is insignifi-
cant, since pyca and pynacl have similar execution times in comparison to other
implementations in C and Rust.
• The Bouncy Castle library (in Java), ed25519-java and the crypto library (in Go)
placed last in our tests likely due to field element representations, which can increase
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performance considerably (as seen in Section 6.1.2).
Figure 6.4: Key generation benchmarks for Ed25519 implementations in various lan-
guages.
Figure 6.5: Signature generation benchmarks for Ed25519 implementations in various
languages.
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Figure 6.6: Signature verification benchmarks for Ed25519 implementations in various
languages.
As seen in our benchmarks of Ed25519 implementations, Rust offers high performance,
while providing desirable features for cryptographic applications, such as memory safety.
6.1.4 Memory Usage
Table 6.2 shows peak memory consumption reported by the Massif tool, which encouraged
the following observations:
• The implementations in Java clearly consumes more memory.
• ed25519 (orlp) has the lowest memory consumption.
• Although the total memory consumed (≈ 750 MiB) by Go implementations was
≈ 15× higher than implementations in Python, its stack + heap consumption (≈
85 KiB) was only ≈ 3× higher than implementations in Rust.
• ed25519-donna’s total memory consumption is 9.7 MiB, which surpasses ed25519-fun
and ed25519-dalek by ≈ 1.7 MiB. Regarding stack+heap, however, Rust (ed25519-
dalek and ed25519-fun) showed ≈ 4× more memory usage than C.
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• ed25519-dalek with the simd_backend feature enabled is worth considering: ed25519-
dalek SIMD showed an increase in total memory usage of 0.2 MiB and significant
improvement in signature verification speed. Whereas ed25519-donna did not show
significant changes in regards to peak memory usage after enabling SSE2 instruc-
tions.





Rust/ed25519-fun 8 MiB 29.7 KiB
Rust/ed25519-dalek 8 MiB 29.1 KiB
Rust/ed25519-dalek SIMD 8.2 MiB 90.7 KiB
C/ed25519-donna 9.7 MiB 7.5 KiB
C/ed25519-donna SSE2 9.7 MiB 7.5 KiB
C/ed25519 (orlp) 4.2 MiB 7.2 KiB
Python/pynacl 37.3 MiB 912.1 KiB
Python/pyca 52.7 MiB 2700 KiB
Go/crypto 750.2 MiB 85.4 KiB
Go/ed25519 (oasis) 750.3 MiB 85.2 KiB
Java/ed25519-java 15200 MiB 25400 KiB
Java/Bouncy Castle 15200 MiB 25600 KiB
6.2 Security
The Rust language has features that are appealing for cryptographic implementations,
such as:
Expressiveness. Rust’s type system allows for writing expressive programs. In this
context, creating layers of abstraction and traits converges into lines of code that are
easier to write and read.
6.2. SECURITY 65
Memory safety. Ownership is the main Rust feature, which enables memory manage-
ment [53]. The Rust documentation states three ownership rules: (i) each value has an
owner, (ii) there can only be one owner at a time, and lastly, (iii) the value is dropped
once the owner goes out of scope [54]. These rules implies the following:
• There is no pointer aliasing in Rust (one owner at a time).
• Variables can only be either copied or moved (borrow).
• When the value is dropped its memory is no longer accessible.
The compiler knows when the allocated memory should be freed (lifetime construct).
Use-after-free, double-free and dangling pointers are prevented at compile time [53]. Also,
buffer overflow is prevented with built-in bounds checking.
Security measures considered for the Ed25519 implementation in Rust included the
following:
Constant-time operations. Making sure cryptographic implementations are isochronous
is important. Underlying field arithmetic and scalar multiplications should operate in
constant-time to avoid side-channel attacks [55]. Our implementation approaches constant-
time operations for key generation and message signing. An example of this approach is
the use of fixed-window scalar multiplications (Section 5.1.2), which attempts constant-
time execution. The subtle library [56], for instance, is another attempt that provides
constant-time implementations of bitwise operations.
Zeroization. As an exploit mitigation technique, we used the zeroize library [57] to
ensure that secret data is no longer accessible. This library performs memory zeroing
while avoiding compiler optimizations.
Usability. The usability of cryptographic libraries is essential for preventing API misuse.
Simplicity, easy to comprehend documentation and secure code examples were emphasized
as important usability qualities for cryptographic APIs [58]–[60]. Therefore, we adopted
the documentation of a simple and structured interface, that provides distinct types for
the public key, secret key and signature.
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Lastly, we tried classifying our implementation based on security properties exposed
by Chalkias et al. [34] and Brendel et al. [39]:
EUF-CMA (existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks). For a
number of selected messages and its respective signatures, the attacker should not be able
to efficiently output a signature σ∗ for a new message m∗ that can be verified under the
same public key, s.t. m∗ /∈ {mi}i=1N .
SUF-CMA (strong unforgeability under chosen message attacks). This defini-
tion is stronger than the EUF-CMA property. For a number of selected (message mi,
signature σi) pairs, the attacker should not be able to output (m∗, σ∗), s.t. (m∗, σ∗) /∈
{mi, σi}i=1N . This implies that a valid signature for an old message cannot be generated,
except with negligible probability. This is useful for blockchain applications.
BS (binding signatures). The signer cannot generate two messages (m,m∗) that can be
verified under the same signature σ and public key pk, except with negligible probability.
This implies that the signature is bound to the message and the non-repudiation property
is held.
SBS (strongly binding signatures). The attacker cannot output valid (m1, pk1, σ∗)
and (m2, pk2, σ∗), s.t. either m1 6= m2 or pk1 6= pk2 is true. This is an stronger notion
than BS, and implies that the signature is also bound to the public key.
Table 6.3: Security properties satisfied by Ed25519 implementations. Adapted from:
Chalkias et al. [34]. The test vectors, together with the explanation, can found in
Appendix A.
Library 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 SUF-CMA SBS cofactored
Bouncy Castle 3 3 3 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 3 7 7
ed25519-dalek 3 3 3 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 3 3 7 7
ed25519-donna 3 3 3 3 7 7 3 7 7 7 7 3 7 7 7
go/crypto 3 3 3 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 3 3 7 7
libsodium 7 7 7 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 3 3 7
pyca 3 3 3 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 3 3 7 7
ed25519-fun 3 3 3 3 7 7 3 7 7 7 7 3 7 7 7
Appendix A gives an explanation for the test vectors. The following analysis can be
drawn from Table 6.3 [34]:
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• All libraries implements the cofactorless variant of EdDSA. We also considered the
cofactorless version.
• Most implementations offer SUF-CMA security, with the exception of our imple-
mentation (ed25519-fun) and ed25519-donna.
• libsodium checks vectors 0, 1 and 2, which leads to SBS security.
Although the implementation that provides the strongest notion of security satisfies
the SUF-CMA and SBS properties (e.g. libsodium), it is sufficient for a signature scheme
to only satisfy the EUF-CMA property [34]. Therefore, our implementation meets the
standard EUF-CMA security property.
6.3 Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated that Rust is competitive considering its performance and
security properties. Our Ed25519 implementation in Rust has respectable execution times
and memory consumption, which matched Ed25519 libraries implemented in C. We have
also performed benchmarks for comparing 32-bit and 64-bit implementations, and showed
the impact of precomputed values in scalar multiplications. Further, we discussed security
with regard to the implementation (i.e. constant-time operations, usability), Ed25519
algorithm (i.e. SUF-CMA, SBS) and Rust (i.e. memory safety).
In order to achieve memory safety, programs can be written in Java, C# or F#, which
performs runtime checks and garbage collection. However, the consequential overhead
of such memory management is undesired for programs that aims for efficiency. Rust
is not a language for rapid scripting or tasks that does not require performance, such
as Python. Though its features are desirable for cryptographic implementations, where




Taking the RFC 8032 and existing Curve25519 and Ed25519 implementations in C, Java
and Rust and implementing our own is straightforward. However, focusing on the bigger
picture and understanding the overall functionality of the Ed25519 system was not the
only goal. As well as describing the internal functions of the Ed25519 library, we also
presented attributes related to modularity, readability and ease of use.
In addition to the implementation, an evaluation from a security/performance per-
spective was also a part of the contribution. Performance wise, Rust presented execution
times and memory consumption comparable to implementations written in C. We have
also investigated the use of basepoint precomputed table and field element representations
tailored for 32-bit and 64-bit platforms. This investigation showed significant impact in
performance: ≈ 80% performance increase for key generation and signing - using the base
point precomputed table; ≈ 2× performance increase for 64-bit representations. Security
wise, we mainly discussed the unforgeability and non-repudiation (binding signatures)
properties, constant-time operations, zeroization and memory-safety. Thanks to Rust the
implementation is type and memory safe and does not compromise on performance. Con-
sequently, Rust is suitable for writing cryptographic applications and expressive code that
runs efficiently.
Therefore, we were able to explore the understanding of individual functions, opti-
mizations and security properties for Ed25519. This exploration showed the correlation
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between security, efficiency and cryptographic applications. Furthermore, the discrepancy
between specification and the actual implementation was emphasized, where knowledge
about cryptographic implementations is important.
There are two remarks worth raising, especially because we believe they would better
the execution of this work. (i) Understanding the underlying mathematical details and
design helps with the creation of layers of abstractions within the implementation, and
also the writing of better documentations/comments and tests. (ii) Simply let the idea
of cryptographic implementation dictate the quality and focus of the evaluation process:
security, correctness and efficiency are essential.
7.1 Future Works
The Ed25519 implementation can be expanded in the following ways: (i) include batch
verification functions; (ii) implement layers of abstraction for internal mathematical repre-
sentations; (iii) include optimization configurations for scalar multiplications and support
for 32-bit and 64-bit platforms; (iv) include the necessary modifications and verification
for signature malleability and security notions, such as strong unforgeability and strongly
binding signatures; (v) optimize arithmetic operations by using a vectorized SIMD imple-
mentation. Beyond that, we glimpse the idea of implementing other instances of EdDSA
(e.g. Ed448) and analyzing its contrasting properties in comparison to Ed25519; also,
the implementation of ristretto255 1 for Ed25519; and lastly, we consider the addition of
support for other environments (resource-limited devices) and the no_std feature, plus
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Listing A.1 shows the test vectors used in the security evaluation, found in [34]. There
are 12 test vectors in total:
• Notation: public key A; signature (R, S); hashed secret key h; group order L.
• Tests vectors 0-3 passes both cofactored and cofactorless verification. Tests 0-2 have
small R, A or both, whereas test 3 has mixed-order A and R.
• Test vector 4 passes cofactored but fails in cofactorless verification.
• Test 5 is rejected in cofactored verification that erroneously performs (8h mod L)A
instead of 8(hA).
• Tests 6-7 passes for libraries that accept non-canonical S or performs an incomplete
check.
• Tests 8-9 have a non-canonical R; vector 8 passes if the library reduces R before
hashing; vector 9 passes if the library does not reduce R before hashing.
• Vector 10-11 have a non-canonical A; test 10 passes if the library reduces A before
hashing; test 11 passes if the library does not reduce A before hashing.














































































Listings B.1, B.2 and B.3 shows the code that performs point addition, subtraction and
doubling, respectively.
Listing B.1: Implementation of addition for extended points (P 3).
1 impl Add<Cached> for P3 {
2 type Output = P1P1;
3
4 fn add(self, p: Cached) -> P1P1 {
5 let YpX = self.Y + self.X; // Y1 + X1
6 let YmX = self.Y - self.X; // Y1 - X1
7 let B = YpX * p.YpX; // (Y1 + X1) * (Y2 + X2)
8 let b = YmX * p.YmX; // (Y1 - X1) * (Y2 - X2)
9 let c = p.T2d * self.T;
10 let d = self.Z * p.Z;
11 let e = d + d;
12 let x = B - b;
13 let y = B + b;
14 let z = e + c;
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26 impl Add<Precomp> for P3 {
27 type Output = P1P1;
28
29 fn add(self, p: Precomp) -> P1P1 {
30 let YpX = self.Y + self.X; // Y1 + X1
31 let YmX = self.Y - self.X; // Y1 - X1
32 let a = YpX * p.YpX; // (Y1 + X1) * (Y2 - X2)
33 let b = YmX * p.YmX; // (Y1 - X1) * (Y2 - X2)
34 let c = p.XY2d * self.T; // D * 2 * (X2 * Y2) * T
35 let d = self.Z + self.Z; // Z1 + Z1
36 let x = a - b;
37 let y = a + b;
38 let z = d + c;










Listing B.2: Implementation of subtraction for extended points (P 3).
1 impl Sub<Cached> for P3 {
2 type Output = P1P1;
3
4 fn sub(self, p: Cached) -> P1P1 {
5 let YpX = self.Y + self.X;
6 let YmX = self.Y - self.X;
7 let a = YpX * p.YmX;
8 let b = YmX * p.YpX;
9 let c = p.T2d * self.T;
10 let d = self.Z * p.Z;
11 let e = d + d;
12 let x = a - b;
13 let y = a + b;
14 let z = e - c;












26 impl Sub<Precomp> for P3 {
27 type Output = P1P1;
28
29 fn sub(self, p: Precomp) -> P1P1 {
30 let YpX = self.Y + self.X; // Y1 + X1
31 let YmX = self.Y - self.X; // Y1 - X1
32 let a = YpX * p.YmX; // (Y1 + X1) * (Y2 - X2)
33 let b = YmX * p.YpX; // (Y1 - X1) * (Y2 - X2)
34 let c = p.XY2d * self.T; // 2 * D * (X2 * Y2) * T
35 let d = self.Z + self.Z; // Z1 + Z1
36 let x = a - b;
37 let y = a + b;
38 let z = d - c;










Listing B.3: Implementation of doubling for projective points (P 2).
1 pub fn double(&self) -> P1P1 {
2 let A = self.X.square();
3 let B = self.Y.square();
4 let C = self.Z.double_square();
5 let Y_plus_X = self.X + self.Y;
6 let a = Y_plus_X.square();
7 let y = A + B;
8 let z = B - A;
9 let x = a - y;












Listing C.1 shows the code that performs h = a · B, s.t. a is a scalar and B is the base
point (Ed25519 parameter).
Listing C.1: Scalar multiplication in constant-time.
1 pub fn select(pos: usize, b: i8) -> Precomp {
2 // Check if b is negative (1u8: true, 0u8: false)
3 let negative = (b as u8) >> 7;
4
5 // If b is negative:
6 // we have b - (b << 1), which results in its absolute value.
7 // If b is positive:
8 // we have b - 0x00 = b.
9 let absolute: u8 = (b - (((-(negative as i8)) & b) << 1)) as u8;
10 let mut t = Precomp::zero();
11
12 // Assign value based on pos (exponent of base 256) and
13 // absolute ([1, 8]).
14 // Ex.: if pos = 1 and absolute = 8, t is assigned (8 * 256^{1} * B).
15 t.conditional_assign(&PRECOMP_BASE[pos][0], equal(absolute, 1u8).into());
16 t.conditional_assign(&PRECOMP_BASE[pos][1], equal(absolute, 2u8).into());
17 t.conditional_assign(&PRECOMP_BASE[pos][2], equal(absolute, 3u8).into());
18 t.conditional_assign(&PRECOMP_BASE[pos][3], equal(absolute, 4u8).into());
19 t.conditional_assign(&PRECOMP_BASE[pos][4], equal(absolute, 5u8).into());
20 t.conditional_assign(&PRECOMP_BASE[pos][5], equal(absolute, 6u8).into());
21 t.conditional_assign(&PRECOMP_BASE[pos][6], equal(absolute, 7u8).into());
22 t.conditional_assign(&PRECOMP_BASE[pos][7], equal(absolute, 8u8).into());
23
24 // Negative of t.
25 let negative_t = Precomp {
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37 /// Converts a to radix 16 representation.
38 /// a: a[0] + 256 * a[1] + 256^{2} * a[2] + ...
39 /// + 256^{31} * a[31].
40 fn radix16(a: &[u8]) -> [i8; 64] {
41 let mut e = [0i8; 64];
42
43 // Split each byte into two 4-bit values.
44 // [e[0]..e[62]] values ranges between 0 and 15.
45 // e[63] ranges between 0 and 7.
46 for i in 0..32 {
47 e[2 * i + 0] = (a[i] & 15) as i8;
48 e[2 * i + 1] = ((a[i] >> 4) & 15) as i8;
49 }
50
51 // Convert each value from e to [-8..7].
52 let mut carry: i8 = 0;
53 // 10 -> -6, 9 -> -7, 8 -> -8...
54 for i in 0..63 {
55 e[i] += carry;
56 carry = e[i] + 8;
57 carry >>= 4;
58 e[i] -= carry << 4;
59 }





65 /// Performs scalar multiplication h = a * B.
66 /// a: a[0] + 256 * a[1] + 256^{2} * a[2] + ...
67 /// + 256^{31} * a[31].
68 /// B: Ed25519 base point (x, 4/5) with positive x.
69 /// Uses precomputed values.
70 pub fn scalar_multiply(a: &[u8]) -> P3 {
71 let e: [i8; 64] = Precomp::radix16(a);
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72 let mut t: Precomp;
73
74 let mut h = P3::zero();
75 // 64 table lookups
76 // 64 point additions
77 for i in (1..64).step_by(2) {
78 t = Precomp::select(i / 2, e[i]);
79 h = (h + t).to_P3();
80 }
81
82 // 4 doublings










93 // 64 point lookups
94 // 64 point additions
95 for i in (0..64).step_by(2) {
96 t = Precomp::select(i / 2, e[i]);






Listing D.1 shows Code that performs r = a ·A+ b ·B, s.t. a and b are scalars and A and
B (base point) are points.
Listing D.1: Sliding-window scalar multiplication.
1 pub fn slide(a: &[u8]) -> [i8; 256] {
2 let mut r = [0i8; 256];
3
4 // Each bit in a has its own position in r.
5 for i in 0..256 {
6 r[i] = (1 & (a[i >> 3] >> (i & 7))) as i8;
7 }
8
9 for i in 0..256 {
10 if r[i] != 0 {
11 for b in 1..min(7, 256 - i) {
12 if r[i + b] != 0 {
13 if r[i] + (r[i + b] << b) <= 15 {
14 r[i] += r[i + b] << b;
15 r[i + b] = 0;
16 } else if r[i] - (r[i + b] << b) >= -15 {
17 r[i] -= r[i + b] << b;
18 for k in i + b..256 {
19 if r[k] == 0 {
20 r[k] = 1;
21 break;
22 }
23 r[k] = 0;
24 }













36 pub fn double_scalar_multiply_vartime(a: &[u8], b: &[u8], A: P3) -> P2 {
37 let aslide = P2::slide(a);
38 let bslide = P2::slide(b);
39
40 // A * I precomputation.
41 // {A, 3A, 5A, 7A, 9A, 11A, 13A, 15A}.






48 AI[0] = A.to_Cached(); // A
49 let A2 = A.double().to_P3(); // 2A
50 for i in 1..8 {
51 // 3A, 5A, 7A, ..., 15A
52 AI[i] = (A2.add(AI[i - 1])).to_P3().to_Cached();
53 }
54
55 let mut r = P2::zero();
56 let mut i: usize = 255;
57
58 loop {












71 // Doubling chain.
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72 let mut t = r.double();
73
74 if aslide[i] > 0 {
75 t = t.to_P3() + AI[(aslide[i] / 2) as usize];
76 } else if aslide[i] < 0 {
77 t = t.to_P3() - AI[(-aslide[i] / 2) as usize];
78 }
79
80 if bslide[i] > 0 {
81 t = t.to_P3() + BI[(bslide[i] / 2) as usize];
82 } else if bslide[i] < 0 {
83 t = t.to_P3() - BI[(-bslide[i] / 2) as usize];
84 }
85
86 r = t.to_P2();
87









Listings E.1, E.2 and E.3 shows the implementation of the key generation, signature
generation and signature verification functions, in that sequence.
Listing E.1: Secret key and public key generation functions.
1 /// Generates the secret key: 32 octets of cryptographically
2 /// secure random data.
3 pub(crate) fn generate_key() -> SecretKey {
4 let mut sk = [0u8; 32];





10 /// Generates asymmetric keys: both public and secret,
11 /// as described in RFC 8032.
12 pub fn generate() -> Keypair {
13 let secret = SecretKey::generate_key();
14
15 // Hash the 32-byte private key using SHA-512, storing the digest in
16 // a 64-octet large buffer h. Only the lower 32 bytes are
17 // used for generating the public key.
18 let h = {
19 let mut hash = Sha512::default();
20 hash.input(secret.0);
21 let mut output = hash.result();
22 // Lowest 3 bits of the first octet are cleared
23 output[0] &= 248;
24 // Highest bit of the last octet is cleared
25 output[31] &= 63;
93
94 APPENDIX E. ED25519 PROTOCOL
26 // Second highest bit of the last octet is set




31 // Scalar multiplication: h * B.
32 let point = Precomp::scalar_multiply(&h[0..32]);
33 // Encode P2 point y coordinate.
34 let public = PublicKey(point.encode());
35
36 Keypair { secret, public }
37 }
Listing E.2: Signature generation function.
1 /// RFC 8032.
2 /// Generates the signature.
3 pub fn sign(&self, public: &PublicKey, message: &[u8]) -> Signature {
4 // Hash the secret key using SHA-512.
5 let h = {
6 let mut hash = Sha512::new();
7 hash.input(self.0);
8 let mut output = hash.result();
9 output[0] &= 248;
10 output[31] &= 63;




15 // Compute SHA-512(prefix || PH(M)), where M is the
16 // message to be signed and prefix is the second half of h.
17 // Interpret the 64-octet digest as a little-endian integer r.
18 let mut r = {






25 // Compute the point [r]B. For efficiency, do this by first
26 // reducing r modulo L, the group order of B.
27 reduce(&mut r[..]);
28 let R: P3 = Precomp::scalar_multiply(&r[0..32]);
29
30 // Compute SHA512(enc(R) || A || PH(M)), and interpret the
31 // 64-octet digest as a little-endian integer k.
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32 let mut k = {








41 // The signature.
42 let mut signature = [0u8; 64];
43 // Populate the second half of the signature with the
44 // result of (r + k * s) mod L.
45 multiply_add(&mut signature[32..64], &k[0..32], &h[0..32], &r);
46
47 // Populate the first half of the signature with the
48 // encoding of R.
49 for (result_byte, source_byte) in &mut signature[0..32].iter_mut().zip(R.encode().iter()) {




Listing E.3: Signature verification function.
1 /// Verifies the signature.
2 pub fn verify(&self, message: &[u8], sig: &Signature) -> Result<(), Error> {
3 let signature = sig.as_bytes();
4 let s = &signature[32..64];
5




10 // Try to decode the public key into a P3 point.
11 // Verification fails if decoding fails.
12 let A = match P3::decode(self.0) {
13 Some(point) => point,





19 // Compute SHA512(R || A || PH(M)), and interpret the
20 // 64-octet digest as a little-endian integer k.
21 let mut k = {
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30 // Check the group equation [s]B = R + [k]A'.
31 // Perform [s]B + [k]A'.
32 let eq = P2::double_scalar_multiply_vartime(&k[..], s, A);










43 } else {
44 return Err(Error::SignatureMismatch);
45 }
46 }
